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ABSTRACT 
Most contemporary deliberative democrats contend that deliberation is the group activity 
that transforms individual preferences and behavior into mutual understanding, agreement 
and collective action. A critical mass of these deliberative theorists also claims that John 
Dewey’s writings contain a nascent theory of deliberative democracy. Unfortunately, very 
few of them have noted the similarities between Dewey and Robert Goodin’s theories of de-
liberation, as well as the surprising contrast between their modeling of deliberation as a 
mixed monological-dialogical process and the prevalent view expressed in the deliberative 
democracy literature, viz., that deliberation is predominantly a dialogical process. Both 
Dewey and Goodin have advanced theories of deliberation which emphasize the value of 
internal, monological or individual deliberative procedures, though not to the exclusion of 
external, dialogical and group deliberation. In this paper I argue that deliberative theorists 
bent on appropriating Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation for political purposes should 
first consider Goodin’s account of ‘deliberation within’ as a satisfactory if not superior 
proxy, an account of deliberation which has the identical virtues of Dewey’s theory—
imaginative rehearsal, weighing of alternatives and role-taking—with the addition of one 
more, namely, that it operates specifically within the domain of the political.  
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Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what 
the various lines of possible action are really like. It 
is an experiment in making various combinations of 
selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what 
the resultant action would be like if it were entered 
upon.  
J. Dewey1  
 
[. . .] the more democratically deliberative our inter-
nal reflections manage to be, the less it will matter 
that external-collective decision procedures can 
never be as directly deliberatively democratic as we 
might like in large-scale societies. 
R. Goodin2 
 
0. Introduction 
 
Most contemporary deliberative democrats contend that deliberation is the 
group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into mu-
tual understanding, agreement and collective action. A critical mass of these 
deliberative theorists also claims that John Dewey’s writings contain a nascent 
theory of deliberative democracy. Unfortunately, very few of them have noted 
the similarities between Dewey and Robert Goodin’s theories of deliberation, 
as well as the surprising contrast between their modeling of deliberation as a 
mixed monological-dialogical process and the prevalent view expressed in the 
deliberative democracy literature, viz., that deliberation is predominantly a 
dialogical process. Both Dewey and Goodin have advanced theories of delib-
eration which emphasize the value of internal, monological or individual delib-
erative procedures, though not to the exclusion of external, dialogical and 
group ones. In this paper I argue that deliberative theorists bent on appropri-
ating Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation for political purposes should first 
consider Goodin’s account of ‘deliberation within’ as a satisfactory if not supe-
rior proxy, an account of deliberation which has the identical virtues of 
                                                 
1 J. Dewey, “The Nature of Deliberation” in Human Nature and Conduct, LW 14:132. Cita-
tions are to The Collected Works of John Dewey: Electronic Edition, edited by L.A. Hickman 
(Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corp., 1996), following the conventional method, LW (Later 
Works) or MW (Middle Works) or Early Works (EW), volume: page number. 
 
2 R. Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 29, no. 
1 (2000): 81-109, 109. 
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Dewey’s theory—imaginative rehearsal, weighing of alternatives and role-
taking—with the addition of one more, namely, that it operates specifically 
within the domain of the political.  
The paper is organized into five sections. In the first section, I summarize 
the positions of those scholars defending the view that John Dewey was a 
proto-deliberative democrat, anticipating the deliberative turn in democratic 
theory. The second section examines Dewey’s monological theory of moral de-
liberation. In the third section, I present the key features of Goodin’s theory of 
monological political deliberation and reveal some commonalities between it 
and Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation. The fourth section asks and answers 
the question: Is there greater continuity or discontinuity between dialogical 
and monological theories of deliberation? In the fifth and concluding section, I 
share a lesson that the Dewey-Goodin comparison might impart to commenta-
tors enamored with the idea that Dewey’s vision of democracy is essentially 
deliberative.  
 
1. Dewey, a Deliberative Democrat? 
 
Over the past decade, the claim that John Dewey was a deliberative democrat 
or a proto-deliberative democrat has become increasingly common in both the 
literature on deliberative democracy and classical American Pragmatism. 
Among deliberative democrats, John Dryzek acknowledges that “an emphasis 
on deliberation is not entirely new,” and points to “[a]ntecedents” in the an-
cient Greeks, Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill and “in theorists from the 
early twentieth century such as John Dewey.”3 Likewise, deliberative theorists 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson note that “[i]n the writings of John 
Dewey [. . .] we finally find unequivocal declarations of the need for political 
discussion [. . .] [and] widespread deliberations as part of democracy.”4 Delib-
erative democrat Jürgen Habermas invokes John Dewey’s argument that 
genuine democratic choice cannot be realized by majority voting alone, but 
must also be complemented by deliberation—or in Dewey’s words, “prior re-
course to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion.”5 Jane Mans-
                                                 
3 J.S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 2. 
4 A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 9. 
5 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1996), p. 304. J. Dewey, “The 
Problem of Method” in The Public and Its Problems, LW 2:365. 
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bridge and John Gastil have taken these Dewey-inspired theories of delibera-
tive democracy a step farther, employing them to study the actual phenome-
non of deliberation in communities and small groups.6 Still, while the general 
idea can be traced back to John Dewey, the name ‘deliberative democracy’ has 
a fairly recent origin. With genealogical precision, James Bohman pinpoints 
“its recent incarnation” in the work of the political scientist “Joseph Bessette, 
who [in 1980] coined it to oppose the elitist and ‘aristocratic’ interpretation of 
the American Constitution.”7  
Among Dewey scholars, the coronation of Dewey as a nascent deliberative 
democrat has been comparatively slow. One remarkable conversion was sig-
naled by Dewey biographer Robert Westbrook’s admission that Dewey’s de-
mocratic vision resembles deliberative democracy more than participatory 
democracy. Writing after the publication of his widely heralded Dewey biog-
raphy, he confesses: “[. . .] I think we might say that Dewey was anticipating 
an ideal that contemporary democratic theorists have dubbed “deliberative 
democracy.” Indeed, I wish this term was in the air when I was writing John 
Dewey and American Democracy, for I think it captures Dewey’s procedural 
ideals better than the term I used, “participatory democracy,” since it suggests 
something of the character of the participation involved in democratic associa-
tions.8 
                                                 
6 J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980). J. Gastil, Democracy in Small Groups: Participation, Decision Making, and 
Communication (Philadelphia: New Society, 1993).  
7 J. Bohman, “The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 4 (1988): 400-25, 400. Likewise, Mansbridge writes, “[i]n . . . a pre-
scient paper . . . presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting but 
never published . . . [demonstrating] that in Congress deliberation on matters of the com-
mon good plays a much greater role than either the pluralist or the rational-choice schools 
had realized.” Mansbridge, “Self-Interest and Political Transformation,” in Reconsidering 
the Democratic Public, eds. G. E. Marcus and R. L. Hanson, 91-109 (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 94. Bohman and Rehg claim that John 
Dewey and Hannah Arendt were precursors to contemporary deliberative democrats, but 
then qualify their claim with the disclaimer that “[t]he term ‘deliberative democracy’ seems 
to have been first coined by Joseph Bessette.” Bohman, J. and W. Rehg. “Introduction.” In 
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. J. Bohman and W. Rehg, ix-xxx. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. xii.  
8 R. B. Westbrook, “Pragmatism and Democracy: Reconstructing the Logic of John 
Dewey’s Faith,” in The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law and Cul-
ture, edited by M. Dickstein, 128-140 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 138. J. 
Bessette, “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government,” in 
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In other words, Dewey developed an ideal of intelligent social action that 
outstripped the ideal of participatory politics. While Westbrook saw the mass 
politics and direct action of grassroots groups in the 1960s (e.g., Students for a 
Democratic Society) as distinctly Deweyan, he later revises his view. Even 
more than participatory democracy, Dewey’s democratic vision resembles the 
deliberative strain of democratic theory. Why? If we follow Joshua Cohen’s 
definition of deliberative democracy (as Westbrook does), that is, an associa-
tion for coordinating action through norm-governed discussion, then delibera-
tive democracy appears surprisingly similar to Dewey’s vision of democracy. 
In Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems, democratic methods encompass com-
munication and collaborative inquiry undertaken by citizens within a commu-
nity and against a rich background of supportive institutions.9 Through the 
social activity of appraisal or evaluation, private preferences, or what Dewey 
terms “prizings” (i.e., what is valued or desired), are converted into publicly 
shared values (i.e., what is valuable or desirable).10 Similarly, deliberative de-
mocrats model deliberation as a communicative process for resolving collective 
problems that depends on converting individual ends and preferences into 
shared objectives and values. For instance, deliberation-friendly political theo-
rist Ian Shapiro claims that “[t]he unifying impulse motivating [deliberation] 
________________________________________ 
How Democratic is the Constitution?, edited by R. Goldwin and W. Shambra, 102-116 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981). 
9 Dewey connects the concepts of communication and community: “To learn to be human is 
to develop through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of being an indi-
vidually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its be-
liefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers 
into human resources and values.” Dewey, “Search for the Great Community,” in The Pub-
lic and Its Problems, LW 2:332. 
10 Dewey, “Propositions of Appraisal” in Theory of Valuation, LW 13:216-8. Id., “The Con-
struction of Good” in The Quest for Certainty, LW 4:207. Moreover, Dewey denies that indi-
viduals are typically cognizant of their own values: “Values and loyalties go together, for if 
you want to know what a man’s values are do not ask him. One is rarely aware, with any 
high degree of perception, what are the values that govern one’s conduct.” “The Basic Val-
ues and Loyalties of Democracy,” LW 14:275. Hickman connects Dewey’s theory of valua-
tion to his theory of deliberation: “What is experimentally determined to be valuable is con-
structed from the inside of what Dewey calls a deliberative situation, or what some have 
described in more general terms as deliberation within a ‘lifeworld.’” L. Hickman, Pragma-
tism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2007), p. 160. 
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is that people will modify their perceptions of what society should do in the 
course of discussing this with others.”11  
A new generation of Dewey scholars has emerged to enthusiastically en-
dorse the proposition that Dewey anticipated the deliberative turn in democ-
ratic theory. Some locate the source of Dewey’s ideas about democratic delib-
eration in his books and articles on politics, while others see a closer connection 
to his works on ethics.12 Two of the more prominent scholars in this group, 
Noëlle McAfee and William Caspary, explicitly tie Dewey’s nascent theory of 
democratic deliberation to operative concepts in both his political and ethical 
writings. For McAfee, “Dewey’s emphasis on publicness” and “public dis-
course” clarifies “how a given policy would or would not satisfy their [i.e., the 
discoursing citizens’] own concerns, values, and ends—including the value they 
place on the welfare of the community itself.”13 Publicness for Dewey resem-
bles the contemporary deliberative democrat’s full-blooded sense of public de-
liberation, that is, discourse intended to transform individual perspectives and 
goals into shared ideals and public values. Even though deliberation for Dewey 
is a way of addressing moral problems, on Westbrook’s account, it also repre-
sents a method for confronting social and political problems: “Dewey’s goal [in 
offering a theory of ethical deliberation] is to move toward an account of pub-
lic deliberation on issues of society-wide concern.”14 As we shall see, West-
brook’s case for Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation converging with con-
temporary theories of deliberative democracy might not be as water-tight once 
we gain a fuller appreciation for Dewey and Goodin’s theories of monological 
deliberation.  
                                                 
11 I. Shapiro, “The State of Democratic Theory,” in Political Science: The State of the Disci-
pline, eds. I. Katznelson and H. Milner, 235-265 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), p. 238. 
12 Among those scholars who see the connection between Dewey’s theory of democratic de-
liberation and his political writings, see, S. Ralston, “Deliberative Democracy as a Matter of 
Public Spirit: Reconstructing the Dewey-Lippmann Debate.” Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 
25, no. 3/4 (2005): 17-25; and Z. Vanderveen, “Pragmatism and Democratic Legitimacy: 
Beyond Minimalist Accounts of Deliberation.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 
21, no. 4 (2007): 243-258. For those who see a closer tie to his ethical works, see V. Co-
lapietro, “Democracy as a Moral Ideal,” The Kettering Review, vol. 24, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 21-
31; and G.F. Pappas, John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience (Bloomington and Indi-
anapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008).  
13 N. McAfee, “Public Knowledge,” Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 30, no. 2 
(2004):139-157, 149. 
14 W. R. Caspary, Dewey on Democracy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 
p. 140. 
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Lastly, it should be mentioned that Dewey never employed the term ‘delib-
eration’ while addressing political subject-matter. Instead, terminology such as 
‘communication’ and ‘dialogue’ took center-stage. For instance, in The Public 
and Its Problems, Dewey writes: “Systematic and continuous inquiry . . . and 
its results are but tools after all. Their final actuality is accomplished in face-
to-face relationships by means of direct give and take. Logic in its fulfillment 
recurs to the primitive sense of the word: dialogue.”15 Moreover, moral delib-
eration is not exhausted by dialogue, for as Dewey notes, only “[s]ome people 
deliberate by dialogue.”16 Other deliberators engage in visualization, imagina-
tive agency and imaginative commentary. Despite the terminological shift, 
moral deliberation often pervades dialogue about politics because these com-
munications involve the disclosure and clarification of personal preferences, or 
“prizings,” as well as their conversion into shared moral values and ideals.  
To avoid foreclosing the many possible avenues for creating a democratic 
community, Dewey did not lay out the particulars, a plan of action or a final 
destination in the struggle to institutionalize a better (or best) form of democ-
racy—let alone, a deliberative democracy. According to Aaron Schutz, 
“Dewey resisted calls for him to develop a specific model of democratic gov-
ernment, arguing that it must look differently in different contexts.”17 Unfor-
tunately, Dewey’s vagueness about how to institutionalize democracy has 
given rise to a series of trenchant criticisms concerning the feasibility of his 
democratic ideal.18 Nevertheless, Dewey did propose a set of leading principles 
or postulations that together he calls the “social idea” of democracy. 19 As pos-
                                                 
15 Dewey, “The Problem of Method,” in The Public and Its Problems, LW 2:371. 
16 Dewey, “Psychology of Ethics,” Lecture XXIX, March 18, 1901, in Lectures on Ethics: 
1900-1901, ed. D. F. Koch (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1991), pp. 241-245, 
245. 
17 A. Schutz, “John Dewey and ‘a Paradox of Size’: Democratic Faith and the Limits of 
Experience,” American Journal of Education, vol. 109, no. 3 (2001): 287-319, 288. 
18 See Alfonso Damico and Richard Posner’s critiques. Damico, A. J. Individuality and Com-
munity: The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey (Gainesville, FL: University of Flor-
ida Press, 1978), pp. 118. Posner, R. Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), pp. 109-110. 
19 Dewey writes: “We have had occasion to refer in passing to the distinction between de-
mocracy as a social idea and political democracy as a system of government. The two are, of 
course, connected. The idea remains barren and empty save as it is incarnated in human re-
lationships. Yet in discussion they must be distinguished.” Similar to Fukuyama, though, 
Dewey defines political democracy, generally, in liberal-democratic terms, that is, as those 
“traditional political institutions” which include “general suffrage, elected representatives, 
[and] majority rule.” Dewey, “The Search for the Great Community,” in The Public and Its 
Problems, LW 2:325-6.  
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tulations, these ideas are intended to direct subsequent investigations into the 
design of stable and viable governing apparatuses; however, taken alone, they 
have no direct correspondence with any particular set of institutions.20  
 
 
2. Dewey on Moral Deliberation 
 
Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation is integral to a broader theory, namely, a 
theory (or method) of ethical inquiry. So, to fully appreciate moral delibera-
tion, one must first look to his larger account of how one inquires about ethical 
subject-matter. Ethical inquiry loosely resembles the pattern of experimental 
inquiry in positive science, involving the (i) identification of a problem, (ii) 
formation of a hypothesis, (iii) working out the implications of the hypothesis 
and (iv) testing the hypothesis.21 With respect to their differences, ethical in-
quiry and scientific inquiry have separate objectives: improving value judg-
ments and explaining phenomena, respectively.22 “[T]he moral phase of the 
problem,” Dewey notes, is just “the question of values and ends.”23 Values di-
rect choice and action when existing habits prove unhelpful or obstructive to 
good conduct. Value judgments can be assessed naturalistically, that is, in 
terms of whether they cultivate intelligent habits of ethical conduct—habits 
that make humans better adapted to their natural and social environment.24 
                                                 
20 Dewey’s reluctance to specify model institutions for realizing his democratic ideal is mir-
rored in the aversion that contemporary critical theorists have to institutional design. 
Dryzek explains: “Overly precise specification of model institutions involves skating on thin 
ice. Far better, perhaps, to leave any such specification to the individual involved. The ap-
propriate configuration will depend on the constraints and opportunities of the existing so-
cial situation, the cultural tradition(s) to which the participants subscribe, and the capabili-
ties and desires of these actors.” Dryzek, “Discursive Designs: Critical Theory and Political 
Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 31, no. 3 (1987): 656-679, 665.  
21 More precisely, Dewey explains the five stages of inquiry, as follows: “Upon examination, 
each instance of [intelligent inquiry] reveals more or less clearly, five logically distinct steps: 
(i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of possible solution; (iv) 
development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (v) further observation and ex-
perimental leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbe-
lief.” “The Analysis of a Complete Act of Thought” in How We Think, MW 6:236. 
22 Dewey, “Judgments of Value” in The Logic of Judgments of Practice, MW 8:24-32. Id., 
“Valuation and Experimental Knowledge,” MW 13:23-28. 
23 Id., “Democracy and America,” in Freedom and Culture, LW 13:184. 
24 Id. (with James Hayden Tufts), “The Moral Self,” in Ethics (1932 revision), LW 7:285-
309. 
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They can also be assessed instrumentally, that is, in terms of their efficacy or 
success in achieving favored ends. Finally, they can be evaluated convention-
ally, that is, by recourse to widely approved or potentially approvable commu-
nity standards. 25 In sum, ethical inquiry for Dewey is a form of experimental 
inquiry, or method, a way of improving our value judgments relative to natu-
ralistic, instrumental and conventional criteria of acceptability. 
Deliberation for Dewey occurs during the third stage of ethical inquiry. In 
Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey defines moral deliberation as “a dramatic 
rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing lines of action.”26 To deliber-
ate, the moral agent must, first, temporarily disengage the engine of action; 
then, imagine the possible consequences, good or bad, of “various competing 
lines of action” (i.e., rehearsing them); and, lastly, decide on the best, or most 
morally defensible, course of action given the rehearsal of possibilities.27 More-
over, Dewey’s dramatic rehearsal resembles George Herbert Mead’s notion of 
ideal role-taking, whereby an agent will adopt the perspective of all those af-
fected by the imagined course of action.28 So, deliberation involves the indi-
                                                 
25 Dewey’s ethics requires that we locate the conditions of justification for our value judg-
ments in both the individual’s community (i.e., in terms of standards of general approval) 
and human conduct itself (i.e., in terms of instrumental efficacy), not in a priori criteria, 
such as divine commands, Platonic Forms, pure reason, or a fixed Aristotelian telos. Dewey, 
“Three Independent Factors in Morals,” LW 5:278-88. Id. (with James Hayden Tufts), 
“Moral Judgment and Knowledge,” in Ethics (1932 revision), LW 7:262-83.  
26 Dewey, “The Nature of Deliberation” in Human Nature and Conduct, MW 14:132. 
27 In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey compares ethical deliberation to an imaginative 
“experiment.” Each possible course of action, once worked out, remains tentative and “re-
trievable.” Dewey writes: “It [i.e., deliberation] starts from the blocking of efficient overt 
action, due to that conflict of prior habit and newly released impulse to which reference has 
been made. Then each habit, each impulse, involved in the temporary suspense of overt ac-
tion takes its turn in being tried out. Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the 
various lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in making various combi-
nations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action would 
be like if it were entered upon. But the trial is in imagination, not in overt fact. The experi-
ment is carried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which do not affect physical acts out-
side the body. Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to 
await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, 
its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. 
It is retrievable.” “The Nature of Deliberation” in Human Nature and Conduct, MW 14:132-
3. 
28 Mead writes: “A difference of functions does not preclude a common experience; it is pos-
sible for the individual to put himself in the place of the other although his function is dif-
ferent.” Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934), p. 325. Cited by G. 
Pappas, John Dewey’s Ethics, p. 235. Habermas states that discourse ethics formalizes the 
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vidual moral agent projecting her possible choices and actions into the future. 
Since it occurs “in imagination” and involves individual moral judgment, there 
is good reason to believe that deliberation for Dewey is for the most part a 
monological process.29 And since deliberation is abductive (i.e., concerned with 
hypothesis formation and testing), it is instrumental in the sense that it is 
aimed at experimental confirmation or disconfirmation (relative to tentative, 
not fixed, standards of acceptability), but not in the sense that it satisfies an 
absolute standard or realizes some final end. In contrast, a utilitarian deliber-
ator judges the relative worth (or value) of the alternatives before her relative 
to a single fixed criterion, viz., whether the alternative maximizes hedonistic 
pleasure, happiness or utility.30  
In James Gouinlock’s essay, “Dewey’s Theory of Moral Deliberation,” he 
attempts to show that Morton White’s critique of Dewey’s ethical theory rests 
on several faulty assumptions. In White’s criticism of Dewey’s theory, he di-
rects his attention to the distinction between ‘desired’ and ‘desirable’.31 Rather 
than appreciate ‘desirable’ as Dewey does, that is, as the moral quality of a 
situation which is open to “question,”32 White interprets ‘desirable’ as a good 
that ‘should be desired,’ ‘imposes a duty’ or ‘is desirable under typical circum-
________________________________________ 
process by which roles are exchanged in Mead’s theory of ideal role-taking: “Practical dis-
course may be understood as a communicative process that induces all participants simul-
taneously to engage in ideal role-taking in virtue of its form, that is, solely on the basis of 
unavoidable universal presuppositions of argumentation.” Justification and Application, p. 
50.  
29 Given that value judgments are assessed relative to conventional standards, though, the 
process is never wholly monological. One could say that it is always tainted with dialogue, 
since the conventions were likely settled upon by a community of fellow value-choosers en-
gaged in discourse and conversation.  
30 Pappas, John Dewey’s Ethics, p. 198. 
31 Dewey introduces the distinction in the following passage from The Quest for Certainty: 
“The formal statement [of the difference between immediate and mediated experience] may 
be given concrete content by pointing to the difference between the enjoyed and the enjoy-
able, the desired and the desirable, the satisfying and the satisfactory. To say that some-
thing is enjoyed is to make a statement about a fact, something already in existence; it is 
not to judge the value of that fact. There is no difference between such a proposition and 
one which says that something is sweet or sour, red or black. It is just correct or incorrect 
and that is the end of the matter. But to call an object a value is to assert that it satisfies or 
fulfills certain conditions. Function and status in meeting conditions is a different matter 
from bare existence. The fact that something is desired only raises the question of its desir-
ability; it does not settle it.” Dewey, “The Construction of the Good,” in The Quest for Cer-
tainty, LW 4:207-208. Stevenson, as we will see, overlooks or misunderstands the last sen-
tence. 
32 Ibid. 
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stances.’ However, on Dewey’s view, a good being desired does not settle the 
issue of whether it is desirable; rather, it invites further inquiry. Consequently, 
White challenges a claim Dewey never made, namely, that desiring a good op-
erationalizes its normative value, providing a formula for making a thing de-
sired universally desirable.33 On White’s account, Dewey attempted to close 
Hume’s fork, or the cleavage between descriptive and normative statements, 
and ultimately failed. Gouinlock responds to White’s interpretation: “[T]he as-
sumption that Dewey was working on the ‘is/ought’ problem is simply gratui-
tous.”34 Instead, Dewey was concerned with how inquiry transforms a dis-
rupted situation into a unified one, from a situation fraught with difficulty to 
one that is enjoyable, from a situation in which goods are merely desired to one 
where the goods are reflectively determined to be desirable. According to Gou-
inlock, “‘desirable’ [for Dewey here] means ‘that which will convert the situa-
tion from problematic to consummatory’” in a process that Dewey called 
“moral judgment.”35 Still, what is instructive about White’s objection is that it 
relies on the contested assumption that Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation is 
wholly monological, or an individual process of choice, rather than dialogical, 
or a shared process of discussion and decision making.  
Contra Gouinlock, there is plenty of evidence to support the assumption 
that Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation is wholly monological, or a matter 
of the individual imagining possibilities and weighing (deliberating about) the 
acceptability of alternative courses of action. Individuals test their value 
judgments in lived experience, by (i) acting in accordance with them, (ii) ob-
serving the outcomes, and (iii) evaluating the degree to which they are accept-
able.36 Later in Gouinlock’s essay, he contends that agreement “is possible in 
public affairs” only when we see moral deliberation as “public and social”—
that is, as dialogical.37 Gouinlock continues, “[a]s Dewey repeatedly insisted, 
social problems are moral problems, for they involve the conflict of values. 
Hence, democracy, or social intelligence, is moral method.”38 In other words, 
                                                 
33 Gouinlock summarizes “White’s misunderstanding” in the following manner: “He sup-
poses that Dewey equates ‘desired under normal conditions’ with ‘desirable’ and then ‘de-
sirable’ with ‘ought to be desired.’” “Dewey’s Theory of Moral Deliberation,” 224. 
34 Gouinlock, “Dewey’s Theory of Moral Deliberation,” 219. 
35 Ibid., 224, 220. 
36 Dewey, “Value, Objective Reference, and Criticism,” LW 2:78-97. 
37 Gouinlock, “Dewey’s Theory of Moral Deliberation,” 224.  
38 Ibid., 225. Gouinlock also echoes this idea in his introduction to a collection of Dewey’s 
writings on ethical theory: “Intelligence is far removed from dogmatism. Dewey has no kin-
ship with doctrinaire philosophies and moral finalities. His advocacy of intelligence and his 
faith in the possibilities of human nature constitute a recognition that the responsibility for 
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democratic inquiry is a political extension of Dewey’s method of ethical in-
quiry. Likewise, democratic deliberation is a social extension of Dewey’s the-
ory of moral deliberation. Anticipating McAfee’s thesis by over two decades, 
Gouinlock insists that the common thread between the two is publicness: “The 
method is social in that deliberation and consultation are public.”39 In seeking 
to resolve issues of common concern, democratic citizens engage in communi-
cation—a notion that, Dewey reminds his reader, is intimately connected with 
the concept of community.40 Similar to moral deliberation, political delibera-
tion involves the disclosure and clarification of personal preferences, or “priz-
ings,” as well as their conversion into shared moral values and ideals.  
So, the issue returns with a vengeance: Is Dewey’s theory of deliberation 
monological or dialogical? When elaborated by Gouinlock, McAfee and West-
brook, deliberation has a distinctly dialogical flavor. What Dewey offers in the 
deliberative stage of his ethical inquiry, Gouinlock insists, is a way of intelli-
gently coordinating individual actions, forging shared moral values, and solv-
ing common problems. So, we can safely conclude that Dewey’s theory of 
moral deliberation is not exclusively monological. Instead, Dewey’s dialogical 
theory of moral deliberation nicely harmonizes with contemporary theories of 
deliberative democracy. However, on reading Human Nature and Conduct and 
consulting White’s interpretation, Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation ap-
pears predominantly monological. The truth of the matter is likely somewhere 
in between: Dewey’s theory integrates monological and dialogical aspects into 
a holistic and balanced model of deliberation. At this point, we turn to con-
sider Goodin’s model of political deliberation.  
 
 
________________________________________ 
continued inquiry and social effort is shared by all.” Gouinlock, “Introduction,” in J. Gou-
inlock (ed.), xix-liv, The Moral Writings of John Dewey (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 
1994), p. liii. 
39 Gouinlock, “Dewey’s Theory of Moral Deliberation,” 226. 
40 Dewey writes: “Communication can alone create a great community. Our Babel is not one 
of tongues but of the signs and symbols without which shared experience is impossible.” 
Dewey, “The Eclipse of the Public,” in The Public and Its Problems, LW 2:324. Again, he 
states: “To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an 
effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who under-
stands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further 
conversion of organic powers into human resources and values.” Id., “Search for the Great 
Community” in The Public and Its Problems, LW 2:332. “As in no other method,” Gou-
inlock affirms, “Dewey’s proposed decision procedure involves communication.” “Dewey’s 
Theory of Moral Deliberation,” 226. 
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3. Goodin on Deliberation Within  
 
In his essay “Democratic Deliberation Within,” Goodin rejects two failed 
strategies that deliberative democrats typically use to negotiate the problem of 
scale, or the difficulty of instituting deliberative democracy on a massive, soci-
ety-wide basis: (i) constraining the number of participants and (ii) constraining 
the amount of communication.41 According to the first strategy, the aggre-
gated decisions of networked deliberative forums or a single randomly-selected 
‘microcosm’ forum should reflect the profile of how the entire population 
would, ex hypothesi, decide if it were feasible for them to gather and deliberate 
together. The problem with this kind of “ersatz deliberation,” Goodin com-
plains, is that there is no way of guaranteeing that the outcome would map on 
to the outcome of a deliberation en masse.42 In the second strategy, certain 
formal and institutionalized mechanisms limit the scope of informal delibera-
tions and the impact they can have on the policy-making process. For in-
stance, on Jürgen Habermas’s account, public deliberation occurs in two 
channels, one informal and the other formal, that parallel each other and per-
mit mutual uptake: “Informal public opinion-formation generates ‘influence’; 
influence is transformed into ‘communicative power’ through channels of po-
litical elections; and communicative power is again transformed into ‘adminis-
trative power’ through legislation.”43 Unfortunately, when deliberative theo-
rists employ this second strategy, they champion a severely weakened form of 
deliberation. “In guaranteeing the free and equal expression of opinions in the 
                                                 
41 Goodin, “Deliberation Within,” 81-90.  
42 Ibid., p. 89. Goodin has one particular theorist in mind, James Fishkin, whose delibera-
tive polling technique gathers a randomly selected group of citizens, and polls them before 
as well as after deliberation to determine how the whole population would shift its prefer-
ences if it had the opportunity to deliberate. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion 
and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). 
43 Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference: Con-
testing the Boundaries of the Political, ed. S. Benhabib, 22-30 (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1996), p. 28. Public deliberation occurs “along two tracks that are at different 
levels of opinion- and will- formation, the one constitutional, the other informal.” Id., Be-
tween Facts and Norms, p. 314. Informal discourses take place within what Habermas terms 
“public spheres,” spaces in which publics--or groups of citizens, including social movements 
and private organizations at all levels of civil society--interact and deliberate independently 
of the state, and in ways that are typically critical of state power. Meanwhile, “[s]tanding in 
contrast to the ‘wild’ circles of communication in the unorganized public sphere are the 
formally regulated deliberative and decision-making processes of courts, parliaments, bu-
reaucracies, and the like.” Id., “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contra-
dictory Principles?” Political Theory, vol. 29, no. 6 (2001): 766-781, 773. 
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public sphere,” Goodin notes, “they guarantee everyone a voice but no one a 
hearing.”44 Thus, public deliberation becomes a “blinkered” or “emaciated” ac-
tivity whereby citizens discuss public issues in public forums, but with no as-
surance that formal institutions and their representatives will meaningfully 
engage their deliberated opinions.  
 Goodin’s alternative to these two failed strategies is ‘deliberation 
within’, an account that bears a striking resemblance to Dewey’s theory of 
moral deliberation. In contrast to the dominant modeling of deliberation as an 
almost entirely external process, Goodin sees deliberation as primarily an in-
ternal matter of “weighing [. . .] reasons for and against a course of action” and 
“imagining [oneself in] [. . .] the place of others.”45 However, to interpret 
Goodin’s position as stating that deliberation is exclusively a monological 
process would be a mistake. Instead, it is a shared monological-dialogical proc-
ess, one that has the distinct advantage of being parallel rather than serial and 
thus capable of permitting the inclusion, comparison, recollection and evalua-
tion of “five more people/perspectives at once.”46 Indeed, Goodin’s claim that 
deliberation is initially an internal process of considering alternative rationales 
or courses of conduct closely resembles Dewey’s idea that moral deliberation 
involves “a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination)” and the evaluation of “vari-
ous competing lines of action.”47 The rough equivalent of Goodin’s process of 
‘deliberation within’ and Mead’s notion of ideal role-taking in Dewey’s oeuvre 
                                                 
44 Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within,” 92.  
45 Ibid., 81, 99. 
46 Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within,” 105. Goodin relies on Herbert Simon’s studies 
of human attention. These studies show that serial orderings of information permit the hu-
man brain to process one block of information at a time; parallel orderings allow another 
five blocks to be processed; therefore, serial and parallel processes working together enable 
six blocks of information to be taken up at one time.  
47 “The Nature of Deliberation” in Human Nature and Conduct, MW 14:132. Indeed, Goodin 
approvingly quotes Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems at length: “‘Artists,’ John Dewey 
says, ‘have always been the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward happening in 
itself which is new, but the kindling by its emotion, perception and appreciation . . . Democ-
racy,’ he continues, ‘will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly 
wedded to the art of full and moving communication.’” Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation 
Within,” p. 96. Hearing and reading Josh Houston’s paper, “Contestation and Deliberation 
Within: Dryzek, Goodin, and the Possibility of Legitimacy,” helped me to make this con-
nection between Dewey and Goodin. During his talk, he associated John Dryzek and 
Robert Goodin’s deliberative theories with the ideas of another pragmatist, George Herbert 
Meade. His paper was presented at the International Social Philosophy conference, Port-
land, Oregon, July 18, 2008, and received an award for the best paper by a graduate stu-
dent.  
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is sympathy. “A person entirely lacking in sympathetic response might have a 
keen calculating intellect,” Dewey writes, “but he would have no spontaneous 
sense of the claims of others.”48 Likewise, Goodin argues that imagining “the 
claims of others” helps deliberators forecast how alternative choices will affect 
the interests of those not present. By allowing “internal-reflective delibera-
tions” to complement “external-collective ones in large groups,” Goodin argues 
that deliberative theorists can overcome the problem of scale, enabling smaller 
assemblies of deliberators to “imaginatively represent” the concerns of those 
for who cannot be present or participate.49  
Finally, for Goodin, deliberative practice does not needlessly displace cur-
rent institutional arrangements or threaten political stability: “Instead, as-
pects of the deliberative ideal must be adapted for and incorporated in the core 
elements of democratic institutions as they already exist.”50 In this way, 
Goodin’s democratic theory, similar to Dewey’s, posits a regulative ideal for 
political theorists, policy-makers and institutional designers to diligently pur-
sue.  
 
 
4. Mono/Dia-logical Deliberation 
 
Two crucial standards of democratic behavior are that citizens should be (i) re-
sponsive and (ii) responsible. In Robert Goodin’s words, “Democratic citizens 
are supposed to act responsively, taking due account of the evidence and ex-
perience embodied in the beliefs of others. Democratic citizens are supposed to 
act responsibly, taking due account of the impact of their actions and choices 
on all those (here and elsewhere, now or later) who will be affected by them.”51  
For deliberative democrats, responsiveness and responsibility—or what 
Goodin calls the “pieties of democratic citizenship”—function as relatively un-
controversial norms for regulating citizen deliberations. Unlike most delibera-
tivists, though, Goodin does not believe that responsiveness and responsibility 
manifest predominantly in dialogue with others. “[D]emocratic theorists can 
and should,” Goodin argues, “be more sensitive to what precedes and underlies 
it, accepting internal-reflective deliberations of a suitable sort as broadly on 
par with . . . the sort of external-collective deliberations that look so impracti-
                                                 
48 Dewey (with James Hayden Tufts), “The Place of reason in the Moral Life: Moral Knowl-
edge” in Ethics (1932 revision), MW 5:303. 
49 Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within,” 105. 
50 Id., Innovating Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 5. 
51 Id., Reflective Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 1. 
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cally demanding in modern polities.”52 External deliberations are enriched, as 
both a descriptive and a normative matter, when supplemented by internal de-
liberations. So, Goodin’s conception of the relationship between “external-
collective” and “internal-reflective” deliberation mirrors the connection be-
tween Dewey’s theories of moral deliberation and social intelligence (especially 
on Guoinlock’s reading). 
Despite the promise of the Dewey-Goodin comparison, mainstream Dewey 
scholars would have at least two objections to Goodin’s theory of ‘deliberation 
within’. First, Goodin’s account of deliberation operates largely within the 
domain of political decision making, whereas Dewey’s theory ranges over 
many kinds of social − including moral and political − inquiry. Admittedly, 
Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation does pertain to a much wider domain of 
subject-matter than Goodin’s theory of ‘deliberation within’. However, this 
difference is, at best, superficial − a matter of what Dewey calls “selective em-
phasis.”53 Dewey’s concern was with how humans engage in inquiry generally. 
In contrast, Goodin’s concern is with how humans clarify and justify their po-
litical beliefs − that is, with political deliberation specifically. If anything, this 
difference of emphasis − as mentioned at the outset of the paper − is a virtue of 
Goodin’s theory, transforming it into a more effective tool for analyzing politi-
cal subject-matter, such as the technicalities of preference change in delibera-
tion.54 The second difficulty that Dewey scholars might have with the Dewey-
Goodin comparison is that Goodin’s framing of the distinction between ‘inter-
nal’ and ‘external’ betrays a vicious dualism. Unfortunately, Goodin’s lan-
guage carries with it the intellectual baggage of a long history of epistemologi-
cal and metaphysical system-building, whereby the tools of previous inquiries, 
particularly the labels ‘external’ and ‘internal’, were treated as absolute cate-
gories prefiguring all future inquiries, rather than what they are: tentative and 
functional distinctions which are the products of previous inquiries.55 In addi-
                                                 
52 Ibid., p. 2. 
53 Dewey writes: “Selective emphasis, choice, is inevitable whenever reflection occurs.” 
“Experience and Philosophic Method” in Experience and Nature, LW 1:34. 
54 Goodin and Niemeyer have also shown through an empirical study of a citizen jury that 
more dramatic preference changes occur during the presentation of information to deliber-
ators than when they engage in dialogue with each other. Goodin and S. J. Niemeyer. 
“When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Delibera-
tive Democracy,” Political Studies 51 (2003): 627-649. 
55 Dewey argued that this faulty move of converting tentative and precarious distinctions of 
function into absolute and stable categories of existence—what he called the “philosophic 
fallacy”—was not only disingenuous, but symptomatic of a larger problem in philosophy, a 
doomed “quest for certainty,” whereby philosophers perpetuated, rather than resolved, ar-
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tion, Goodin’s claim that “very much of what goes on in a genuine face-to-face 
conversation is actually contained inside the head of each of the participants” 
would raise concerns for Deweyans.56 According to Larry Hickman, “Dewey 
held that mind arises as a complex tool out of such natural interactions as a 
result of increasing levels of complexity.”57 Thus, deliberation for Dewey is not 
solely a mental event, or something that occurs “inside the head.”58 Rather, it 
is a more inclusive and organic process implicating a nervous system, a brain, a 
neural cortex as well as, and equally important, a multitude of factors within 
the human organism’s environment. Still, there is a solution to this apparent 
incompatibility between Dewey and Goodin’s accounts of deliberation. Rather 
than speak of deliberation as either an internal-mental event or an external-
political activity, Goodin could instead refer to it more generically and without 
reliance on the internal/external dualism. So, on a Deweyan reconstruction of 
Goodin’s theory, deliberation would be conceived as a mono/dia-logical cycle, 
whereby ‘monological’ and ‘dialogical’ stages alternate as part of the continu-
ous and flowing process of patterned deliberative inquiry.59  
________________________________________ 
tificial problems. Dewey writes: “It [the philosophic fallacy] supplies the formula of the 
technique by which thinkers have relegated the uncertain and unfinished to an invidious 
state of unreal being, while they have systematically exalted the assured and complete to 
the rank of true Being.” “Existence as Precarious and Stable” in Experience and Nature, LW 
1:51. 
56 Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within,” 92. 
57 Hickman, L. Pragmatism as Post-postmodernism, p. 238. 
58 Gregory Pappas affirms this point: “Moral deliberation is not something that happens in 
one’s mind. It is experienced as an intermediate phase in the process of transforming a mor-
ally problematic situation into one that is determinate.” John Dewey’s Ethics, p. 94. 
59 The distinction between monological and dialogical deliberation is introduced by Haber-
mas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, translated by F. G. Lawrence (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1987), pp. 298-30. Modeling deliberation as a phasal process, similar to Dewey’s 
stage-by-stage pattern of inquiry, is nothing new for deliberative democrats. It has been 
undertaken by a number of normative theorists and positive researchers. Habermas pro-
poses “a two-stage process,” which applies to a single deliberative episode “consisting of jus-
tification followed by application.” Whereas in the first stage claims and norms are vali-
dated through the test of rational discourse, deliberators in the second stage employ a 
“principle of appropriateness” to adapt the justified claim or norm “in light of the salient 
features of the situation.” Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse 
Ethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp, 36-7. The weakness of Habermas’s two-stage 
model is that it implicates the highly abstract theory of discourse ethics without giving con-
crete guidance for the conduct of practical deliberation. In their study of an Australian de-
liberative forum, Goodin and Niemeyer also construct a two-phase account of the delibera-
tive process, with an ‘information phase’, including “site visit[s], background briefings, 
presentations by and interrogations of witnesses”, and a ‘discussion phase’, wherein “collec-
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5. Conclusion 
 
What distinguishes Goodin and Dewey’s conceptions of deliberation is that 
Dewey’s concerns the personal and collective activity of imagining possible 
ways to solve moral problems, whereas Goodin’s pertains to the internal pro-
cedure of clarifying one’s political beliefs that precedes civic dialogue and deci-
sion making—what he terms ‘deliberation within’. Notwithstanding this minor 
difference of emphasis, Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation shares more in 
common with Goodin’s model of ‘deliberation within’ than it does with the 
predominantly dialogical models of deliberation widely embraced by delibera-
tive democrats. So, if deliberative theorists truly wish to appropriate Dewey’s 
theory of moral deliberation and convert it into a model of political delibera-
tion, then I recommend that they first look to Goodin’s similar, though more 
politically-oriented, theory of deliberation as a suitable if, not superior, substi-
tute. 
________________________________________ 
tive conversations among a group of coequals [takes place] aiming at reaching (or moving 
toward) some joint view on some issues of common concern.” Goodin and Niemeyer, “When 
Does Deliberation Begin?” 633. Although this account does not a comprehensively describe 
the deliberative process, it does have the merit of modeling some features of an actual delib-
erative event--in this case, a Citizen Jury--and in a way that assists researchers in experi-
mentally testing a working hypothesis about the effects of each phase on preference change. 
Among empirical researchers, David Ryfe and James Hyland propose more complex multi-
stage models of deliberation. Ryfe recommends “three moments of the deliberative process: 
[(i)] the organization of the deliberative encounter; [(ii)] the practice of deliberation within 
an encounter; and finally, [(iii)] the product of deliberative talk.” The benefit of Ryfe’s ac-
count is that, in contrast to Habermas’s, it does deploy an actionable--although perhaps 
over-simplified--procedure for programming deliberative events: viz., plan, participate, and 
decide. Ryfe, “Does Deliberative Democracy Work?” Annual Review of Political Science, 
vol. 8 (2005): 49-71, 50. James Hyland (1995:56-7) presents a model wherein “every [delib-
erative] decision has four logically distinct stages or ‘moments’”: namely, (i) agenda-setting 
or “the identification of both the necessity of choosing and the set of available options for 
choice,” (ii) debate and discussion which “involves explicit deliberation,” (iii) the decision 
itself or “the choice to implement one of several available alternative courses of action,” and 
(iv) implementation, when “the choice arrived at is translated into action.” Hyland, Democ-
ratic Theory: The Philosophical Foundations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1995), pp. 56-7. The advantage of Hyland’s model is that it captures two features of delib-
eration which are conspicuously absent in Ryfe’s model: first, the very important (and most 
easily manipulated) stage of establishing the agenda and, second, the final stage of acting on 
the deliberated decision.  
S.J. RALSTON 
 253
 
 
References 
 
Bessette, J. “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican 
Government,” in How Democratic is the Constitution? , edited by R. Goldwin 
and W. Shambra, 102-116. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 
1981. 
Bohman, J. “The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy.” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 4 (1988): 400-25. 
Bohman, J. and W. Rehg. “Introduction.” In Deliberative Democracy: Essays 
on Reason and Politics, edited by J. Bohman and W. Rehg, ix-xxx. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1997. 
Caspary, W. R. Dewey on Democracy. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2000. 
Colapietro, V. “Democracy as a Moral Ideal.” The Kettering Review, vol. 24, 
no. 3 (Fall 2006): 21-31. 
Damico, A. J. Individuality and Community: The Social and Political Thought 
of John Dewey. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1978. 
Dewey, J. The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Electronic Edition, edited by 
L. A. Hickman. Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corp., 1996. 
Dryzek, J. S. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contesta-
tions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Fishkin, J. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New haven: 
Yale University Press, 1995. 
Gastil, J. Democracy in Small Groups: Participation, Decision Making, and 
Communication. Philadelphia: New Society, 1993 
Goodin, R. “Democratic Deliberation Within.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
vol. 29, no. 1 (2000): 81-109. 
− Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative 
Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
− Reflective Deliberation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Goodin, R. E. and S. J. Niemeyer. “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal 
Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy.” Political 
Studies 51 (2003): 627-649. 
Gouinlock, J. “Dewey’s Theory of Moral Deliberation.” Ethics, vol. 88, no. 3 
(April 1978): 218-28.  
− “Introduction.” In The Moral Writings of John Dewey, edited by J. Gou-
inlock, xix-liv.. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994. 
Dewey and Goodin on the Value of Monological Deliberation 
 
 254
Gutmann, A. and D. Thompson. Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, translated by W. Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. 
− “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Princi-
ples?” Political Theory, vol. 29, no. 6 (2001): 766-781. 
− Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press 1993. 
− “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” In Democracy and Difference: Con-
testing the Boundaries of the Political, edited by S. Benhabib, 22-30. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996. 
− The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, translated by F. G. Lawrence. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987. 
Hickman, L. Pragmatism as Post-postmodernism. New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 2007. 
Houston, J. “Contestation and Deliberation Within: Dryzek, Goodin, and the 
Possibility of Legitimacy.” Paper presented at the International Social Phi-
losophy Conference, Portland, Oregon, July 18, 2008.  
Hyland, J. L. Democratic Theory: The Philosophical Foundations. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1995. 
Mansbridge, J. Beyond Adversary Democracy. Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980. 
−“Self-Interest and Political Transformation,” in Reconsidering the Democratic 
Public, edited by G. E. Marcus and R. L. Hanson, 91-109. University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993. 
McAfee, N. “Public Knowledge,” Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 30, no. 2 
(2004): 139-157. 
Mead, G. H. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934. 
Pappas, G. F. John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008. 
Posner, R. Law, Pragmatism and Democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2003. 
Ralston, S. “Deliberative Democracy as a Matter of Public Spirit: Recon-
structing the Dewey-Lippmann Debate.” Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 25, no. 
3/4 (2005): 17-25. 
Ryfe, D. M. “Does Deliberative Democracy Work?” Annual Review of Political 
Science, vol. 8 (2005): 49-71. 
S.J. RALSTON 
 255
Schutz, A. “John Dewey and ‘a Paradox of Size’: Democratic Faith and the 
Limits of Experience,” American Journal of Education, vol. 109, no. 3 (2001): 
287-319. 
Shapiro, I. “The State of Democratic Theory.” In Political Science: The State of 
the Discipline, edited by I. Katznelson and H. Milner, 235-265. New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2002. 
Vanderveen, V. “Pragmatism and Democratic Legitimacy: Beyond Minimalist 
Accounts of Deliberation.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 4 
(2007): 243-258. 
Westbrook, R. B. “Pragmatism and Democracy: Reconstructing the Logic of 
John Dewey’s Faith.” In The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social 
Thought, Law and Culture, edited by M. Dickstein, 128-140. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1998. 
 
